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Abstract:
Pricing of public utilities has long been discussed after Hotteling (1947), and most
preceding arguments have provided a negative answer to the question to attain a
Pareto-efficient allocation in an economy with non-convex production possibilities.
Contrasting to these, Kamiya (1995) provided an argument that it is possible to devise a
pricing mechanism of non-convex technology good(s) such that the equilibrium allocation
under the pricing mechanism is always Pareto-efficient. The present note intends to
examine a small question to find how Kamiya’s arguemnt differs from the preceding,
with an intention to clarify how the efficiency property of his pricing mechanism is
secured. The reconsideration however leads to a negative result that Kamiya’s pricing
mechanism will fail to assure the efficiency property in a simple illustrative economy
considered by himself. We first confirms that the simple example given in Kamiya
contradicts his main theorem, and then review Kamiya’s proving argument and examine
where any slip remains.
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1. Introduction
Pricing of public utilities has long been discussed after Hotteling (1947), and the
succeeding arguments in a general equilibrium setting, like Guesnerie (1975), Beato and
Mas-Colell (1985), and Vohra (1990) etc., have confirmed that while marginal-cost
pricing is necessary for attaining the Pareto-efficient allocation, the efficiency is not
assured even with marginal-cost pricing when production of public utilities shows
increasing returns to scale. Calsamiglia (1977) also confirmed the fact in an abstract way
to examine the possibility of an abstract resource allocation process that satisfies some
necessary properties supposing a simplified economy. Contrasting to these, Kamiya
(1995) provided an argument that it is possible to devise a pricing mechanism of
non-convex technology good(s) such that the equilibrium allocation under the pricing
mechanism is always Pareto-efficient.
Reviewing the preceding arguments as above and comparing their arguments with
Kamiya’s, it can be considered that there may remain a contradictory situation, while
Kamiya states: "In this paper, if there exists an equilibrium then it is Pareto optimal.
Thus if, in an economy, there does not exist a decentralized mechanism which leads to
Pareto optimal allocations, then there does not exist an equilibrium in the economy when
the nonconvex firms follow our nonlinear pricing rule. (Kamiya, p.550)"
The purpose of the present note is to reexamine a small question as above, with an
intention to clarify how the efficiency property of Kamiya’s pricing mechanism is
secured. The reconsideration however leads to a negative result such that Kamiya’s
pricing mechanism will fail to assure the efficiency property in a simple illustrative
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economy considered by himself (Kamiya, p.551, summarized in Fig.1). We thus firstly
confirms that the simple example given in Kamiya’s Fig.1 contradicts his main theorem
(Theorem 1, reproduced in Section 2.1 below). Then we review Kamiya’s proving
argument and examine where any slip remains.
2. The Model Economy and a Contradicting Example
2.1 Kamiya’s Model Economy and Efficient Price Mechanism
We begin by explaining the model economy considered in Kamiya, which is
replicated as follows: there are 1  2 goods in the economy, the first 1 goods, called P
goods, are produced by firms with nonconvex production sets (the natural monopolies)
and the last 2 goods, called C goods, are produced by firms with convex production sets
(the competitive firms). Price vector of C goods is denoted by q  R2 . The firms with
nonconvex production sets are called P firms and the firms with convex production sets
are called C firms. The number of P firms is 1 and the jth P firm produces only jth
good, j  1, . . . , 1, using C goods. (See assumption A2ii below.) The number of C
firms is n and each C firm produces some C goods using the other goods. (See
assumption A2i below.) Yj  R12 , j  1, . . . , 1, and Zk  R12 , k  1, . . . , n, denote
the production set of the jth P firm and the production set of the kth C firm, respectively.
There are m consumers and the ith consumer has a quasi-concave utility function
ui : R12  R , an initial endowments i  R12 and a share holding in the kth C firm,
ik, satisfying ik  0 and i1m ik  1 for i  1, . . . ,m and k  1, . . . , n.
As to consumers’ preferences and producers’ production technologies the following
is assumed:
A1. For i  M  1, . . . ,m
(i) for xi  R12 and   R, there exists xi  R12 such that xih  xih for
h  1, . . . , 1,  xi  xi  , and uixi  uixi , where    denotes the
Euclidian norm,
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(ii) ih  0 for h  L1  1, . . . , 1 and ih  0 for h  L\L1, L 
1, . . . , 1  2.
A2. (i) For k  N  1, . . . , n, Zk  R12 is a closed convex set such that
R12  Zk, and zk  Zk implies that zkj  0 for j  L1.
(ii) For j  L1, there exists a function gj : V  R such that Yj  Kj R12 ,
where V is an open set such that R2  V and Kj  yj  R12  yjh  0 for
h  L1\j, yjC  R2 , and yjj  gjyjC, with yjC designating the vectors of the
last 2 coordinates of yj. Moreover, gj is C2 for yjC  R2 such that gjyjC  0.
(iii) For j  L1, gj0  0, gj is strictly quasi-concave for yjC  R2 such that
gjyjC  0, is increasing in yjC, i.e., for yjC  R2 ,
gjyjC
yjh  0, h  L\L1,
and, for yjC  R2 such that gjyjC  0,
gjyjC
yjh  0, h  L\L1.
(iv) For a  R, there exists yjC  R2 such that a  gjyjC.
(v) For yjC  R2 such that gjyjC  0, let HyjC  h  1, . . . , 2 
yjh  0. Then DgjyjC and eh, h  HyjC, are linearly independent, where
DgjyjC is the gradient of gj at yjC and eh is the hth unit vector in R2 .
The prices of P goods are determined by the following nonlinear pricing rule: first,
the consumers and C firms are asked to report their demands for the jth P goods, x ij and
zkj, for i  M, j  L1, and k  N. (Note that P goods are inputs for C firms so that zkj is
nonpositive.) Defining v j  i1m x ij  k1n zkj, the following function j : R  R2  R
( yjj, q, v j) R is supposed, for given q  R2 and v j  R, which satisfies;
1. jyjj; q, v j, a function of yjj, is expressed by a finite number of parameters,
2. j is concave in yjj  R,
3. jv j; q, v j  Cjv j, q,
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4. if yjj  yjj then jyjj; q, v j  jyjj ; q, v j,
5. jyjj; q, v j  Cjyjj, q for yjj  R,
6. j is differentiable with respect to yjj at yjj  v j, and jv j; q, v j/yjj
 Cjv j, q/yjj.
In the above the following notations are used; R and R2 are the interiors of R and R2 ,
respectively. For yjj  R, q  R2 and j  L1,
Cjyjj, q  min  q  yjC s.t. yjj  gjyjC and yjC  R2 .
Assuming the setting as above, Kamiya proves the following theorem;
Theorem 1 (Kamiya). Under A1 and A2, if an m1  2  11  2
n1  2  2 tuple xi, yj, zk, q  Rm12  j11 Yj  k1n Zk  R2 is
an equilibrium, then xi, yj, zk is a Pareto optimal allocation. Moreover,
xi is individually rational, i.e., uixi  uii for all i  M.
For a later reference let us replicate the definition of an equilibrium by Kamiya;
Definition 1 (Kamiya). An m1  2  11  2  n1  2  2 tuple
xi, yj, zk, q  Rm12  j11 Yj  k1n Zk  R2 is said to be an equilibrium
if
(i) xi  arg maxuixi  j11 jxij, v j, xij, q  q  xiC  q  iC
k1n ikkzkj , v j, q, xi  R12 for i  M, where v j  i1m xij  k1n zkj for
j  L1,
(ii) yjC  arg minq  yjC  yjj  gjyjC and yjC  R2 for j  L1,
(iii) zk  arg maxq  zkC  j11 jzkj , v j,zkj, q  zk  Zk for k  N,
(iv) j11 yjC  k1n zkC  i1m iC  i1m xiC,
(v) yjj  i1m xij  k1n zkj , j  L1,
(vi) xij  0 and zkj  0 for i  M, j  L1 and k  N.
In Definition 1 above the following notations and assumptions are used and/or supposed:
first, the ith consumer maximizes the utility subject to the budget constraint as follows,
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maxxiR12 uixi s.t. j1
1 jx ij, v j, xij, q  q  xiC
 q  iC  k1n ikkzkj, v j, q,
where xiC and iC designate the vectors of the last 2 coordinates of xi and i
respectively, and jx ij, v j, xij, q shows ith consumer’s outlay for xij by the pricing rule
for P goods that is given by utilizing above-explained j function as follows,
jx ij, v j, xij, q  jxij v jx ij , q, v j
x ij
v j .
Second, the prices of C goods are determined competitively. Third, the kth C firm
maximizes the profit on the production set as follows,
maxzkZk q  zkC  j11 jzkj, v j,zkj, q
where zkC denotes the vectors of the last 2 coordinates of zk and jzkj, v j,zkj, q is the
firm’s outlay for zkj given by utilizing the function j for P goods as follows,
jzkj, v j,zkj, q  jzkj v jzkj , q, v j
zkj
v j .
The profit for the kth C firm is denoted by kzkj, v j, q. Last, the jth P firm
minimizes the cost of producing yjj for given yjj and q as follows,
minyjCR2 q  yjC s.t. yjj  gjyjC
2.2 A Contradicting Example
As noted in Introduction a simple economy illustrated by Kamiya himself satisfies
our present purpose to examine whether his Theorem 1 holds in general. For this, let us
reproduce here also the illustrative economy: an economy with two goods, one P firm and
one consumer is supposed and C firm is assumed away. There are a single input, good 2,
and a single output, good 1. The price of good 2 is normalized to be one. The
production set of the P firm, Y1  R2, the initial endowment, 1  R2, and the utility
function of the consumer, u1 : R2  R, are illustrated as in Kamiya’s Fig.1, which is
also reproduced here as Fig.A1.
Utilizing this example Kamiya states that "the marginal cost pricing equilibria are a,
b and c in the figure and only a is Pareto optimal...a cannot be achieved as a competitive
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equilibrium (Kamiya, p.550)". He says also that if the consumer’s budget line is like the
dotted line in the figure under a nonlinear pricing rule, a is an equilibrium of the model.
Now let us confirm point c in the above example drawn in Fig.1 also satisfies the
conditions for equilibrium reproduced in Section 2.1 above if the nonlinear pricing rule is
appropriately defined while fulfilling the conditions for j function set by Kamiya. First,
the nonlinear pricing rule for P goods set by Kamiya says that j functions and
corresponding pricing rules are defined for different levels of production of jth P good,
i.e. depending on various values of v js, as shown in the definition of j above2. Second,
suppose then that j function corresponding to point c is given by the bold dotted line,
named c, in Fig.A here3 and that it satisfies all the conditions for j function specified
in Section 2.1 above. Also, denote the coordinates of point c by yCc  C, yPc where
yCc, yPc is the input-output vector of the P firm at point c and C, 0  1. Third,
note that the set of the allocation and price xCc, xPc, yCc, yPc, 1 satisfies the following,
where xCc, xPc  yCc  C, yPc and the price for the competitive good is normalized to
1;
i) First, the budget constraint for the consumer is given by the following inequality,
1xPc, v 1c , x, 1  xCc  C (1)
where v 1c  xPc, x denotes consumer’s demand for P good, and
1xPc, v 1c , x, 1  cx v1
c
xPc ; 1, v 1c (2)
cxPc v1cxPc ; 1, v 1c  CyPc, 1 by construction with cost function C for the P firm. (1) is
due to that there exists neither competitive firm thus nor production profit, and (2) holds
since the consumer only demands the P good. Then, an indifference curve tangent to the
production frontier YP   at point c is tangent also to the budget constraint above at the
point by the construction of c above, or equivalently by conditions 3 and 6 for j. Thus
xCc, xPc maximizes the utility under the budget constraint (1).
ii) It is clear that all the other conditions for the equilibrium (ii), (iv),(v) and the former
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half of (vi) are satisfied, while the conditions (iii) and the latter half of (vi) can be
dismissed since there is no competitive firm (n is zero and N empty).
Thus point c with j defined as above, i.e. c, for P good satisfies the conditions for
the equilibrium, and a contradiction remains.
2.3 How Inefficient Equilibrium Remains
It is thus of an importance to reconsider why the efficiency result of the proposed
nonlinear pricing rule was asserted. One will be that j functions and the nonlinear
pricing rule defined utilizing js for P goods are considered corresponding to various
production points v j  yjj. That is, while confining our attention to the above-reviewed
example, if the only nonlinear pricing rule or j function is given as Kamiya’s dotted line
in Fig.1 or Fig.A, point a will represent the unique equilibrium under the pricing rule and
the efficiency obtains4. However, they are considered also referring to point c as their
definitions above (pp.4-5) say and the argument in Section 2.2 shows.
Second, it will be conjectured that Kamiya’s proof of the Theorem itself leaves a
key to the slip. So, review Kamiya’s formal arguments and consider why the above
inefficiency continues to exist irrespective of the Theorem. Since his proof relies on the
absurdity (contradiction), consider the question by comparing his arguments with a usual
proof of the first theorem of the welfare economics utilizing the absurdity: i) Reproduce a
rough story of a proof of the first welfare-economics theorem; it starts to assume the
existence of a feasible allocation that assures no worse welfare to all consumers and
(strictly) better welfare at least to a consumer xi, zk  compared to an equilibrium
xi, zk, q where yj and yj are suppressed since there exist only C producers.
Then, Pareto-improving consumption means
qixi  qkzk  ii
Taking account of the feasibility and the equilibrium, this is rewritten
qkzk  ii  qkzk  ii or qkzk  qkzk (3)
This contradicts to profit maximization at zk by C producers, which is reduced to the
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starting assumption of a feasible and Pareto-improving allocation xi, zk .
ii) Consider now Kamiya’s proving argument: Kamiya, like above, begins to assume
the existence of a feasible allocation xi, yj, zk  that is Pareto-improving compared to
the equilibrium one xi, yj, zk. This supposition implies the first strict inequality in
his proof (Kamiya, p.557). Then, taking account of the feasibility of the allocation,
C-firms’ profit maximization and supposition concerning j function leads to the second
and the third inequalities in his proof (Kamiya, p.557). Note here that the strict
inequality in these relations due to the supposition that the allocation xi, yj, zk  is
Pareto-improving compared to the equilibrium one, since the additionally considered
inequalities by referring the feasibility of the allocation, C-firms’ profit maximization and
property of j functions are all weak. By consideration of the feasibility of
xi, yj, zk  and increasingness of js, the last inequality is rewritten utilizing only j
functions (Kamiya, p.558, inequality (1)). Kamiya’s inequality (1) is expressed only by
js, and since the variables there are in the relation of convex combination, Kamiya
concludes that the inequality contradicts the assumed concavity of js. Note here also
that weak concavity of js is sufficient to derive the contradiction.
iii) To make clearer the role of respective assumptions in Kamiya’s proof, repeat his
proving argument for the case of his example used also in Section 2.2 above supposing
that the present equilibrium is point c with the pricing rule specified there and a feasible
and Pareto-improving allocation is given by point a in Fig.A. For reference, denote the
coordinate of point a by xCa, xPa and yCa  C, yPa where xCa, xPa denotes
consumption allocation and yCa, yPa is the input-output vector of the P firm at point a.
Of course xCa, xPa  yCa  C, yPa. Then, since point a is better than point c, the
following inequality holds,
1xPc, v 1c , xPa, 1  xCa  C (4)
since the price for C good is 1 and there is no C firm and its profit. Then, (2) and the
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feasibility of the allocation xCa, xPa, yCa, yPa give the following,
cxPa v1cxPc ; 1, v 1c  yCa  0 (5)
Further, since cyPa; 1, v 1c  CyPa; 1  1  yCa as is supposed and seen in Fig.A,
cxPa v1cxPc ; 1, v 1c  cyPa; 1, v 1c  0 (6)
Since xPa  yPa, (6) is rewritten as,
cxPa v1cxPc ; 1, v 1c  cxPa; 1, v 1c  0 (6
)
Inequality (6 ) corresponds to Kamiya’s inequality (1), and noting v 1c  xPc, (6 ) clearly
provides a straightforward contradiction. It may be noted here that the contradiction is
led without relying on concavity of c (i.e. js) (since the consumer is only one
demanding P good), and that this inequality or inequality (6) comes from the fact that on
the one hand (assumed) higher utility requires the consumption allocation in the better set
and on the other the assumption of smallerness of c (or js) implies (total) price of P
good not larger than its cost of production, i.e., cyPa; 1, v 1c  CyPa; 1  1  yCa.
Now summarize the above review. First, the story or logic leading to a
contradiction for the case of Fig.1 (Fig.A here) as above will say that irrespective of the
introduction of nonlinear pricing rule for P goods it seems to play little role to derive the
efficiency result, and only the conditions well-known in the first welfare-eonomics
theorem are utilized for the proof of Theorem 1. Though appearance differs between (3)
and (5 ), this is really superfluous since (3) is arranged as follows if the maximization of
profit by C firms is taken again into account,
qkzk  qkzk  qkzk (3 )
which will be an expression of (3) corresponding to (5 ). It may thus be said that such a
contradiction as (5 ) or (3 ) is implied in the assumption of existence of a better
allocation. Second, it is noted that (3 ) is derived depending also on the convexity of
production sets of producers, and as to (6 ) concavity of c or js plays the same role.
Though we noted that concavity of c plays little roll to derive (6 ), it says simply that
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the relation like the equality of Kamiya just after inequality (1) is not used to derive (6 ).
However, the expression cxPa v1cxPc ; 1, v 1c means that c (or js) function(s) is applicable
to point a and the point is representable by the function assumed to be concave. That is,
the supposition of a feasible and Pareto-improving allocation together with concavity of
c, when applied to yCa, yPa or point a, will imply that point a is in a convex set that
will be defined by c. This is the same in Kamiya’s proof in the sense that both the first
inequality derived from the assumption of a better allocation (Kamiya, p.557) and the
applicability of js to the allocation (Kamiya, p.558) lead to his inequality (1). If we
think as this, it seems natural that the contradiction (6) or (6 ), as well as Kamiya’s
Theorem 1, is led almost via the same way as the proof of the first welfare-economics
theorem. Third, though the contradiction implied by inequality (6) or (6 ) should be false
since consumption allocation at point a is in reality superior to one at point c, it is
implied, as noted above, by the assumption that xCa, xPa is better and feasible and
production at yCa, yPa is explained by c. However, the last statement itself is
obviously contradictory to what is given in the figure. Fourth, as is well-known, for the
efficiency of an equilibrium in an economy with nonconvex production to hold, it has to
be assured that there exists no feasible allocation better than the equilibrium one.
However it may equal to assume the result.
Notes
1) A difference in Fig.A here from Kamiya’s Fig.1 is that a proposed c function defined
referring to point c, shown by bold dotted line in the figure, is added in the present one.
2) A clear illustration of this is in his Fig.2 (Kamiya, p.552, not reproduced here).
3) In this illustrative economy with one consumer, j function equals consumer’s outlay
for P good (see eq.(2) below), and with just two goods, they can be drawn in a figure.
4) It may be noted also that, when recalling (2) the suggested dotted line by Kamiya in
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Fig.1 may imply a nonconcave j, while j’s concavity is clearer in his Fig.2. Further, it
will be noted that the fact that the nonlinear pricing rule is restricted to one shown by the
dotted line through point a might be seen as if the efficient equilibrium is known in
advance and the nonlinear pricing rule be defined so that the equilibrium is attained via
the pricing rule.
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